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Abstract
This article analyzes the strategic allocation of presidential campaign visits in 2016. In particular, we test whether each
campaign disproportionately targeted its presidential versus vice presidential candidates’ visits toward voters with whom
they shared a salient demographic or political characteristic. Our purpose in doing so is to discern whether—and, if so,
among which groups—the campaigns perceived the candidates as having a strategic advantage in appealing to affiliated
voters. To this end, we analyze an original database of 2016 campaign visits that includes local population characteristics for
each host site. Our results indicate that each ticket’s visits were highly coordinated across states, but frequently divergent
within states. At the substate level, we find several systematic differences in the populations visited by presidential versus
vice presidential candidates—in some cases aligning with a candidate’s personal characteristics. We discuss these findings’
implications with respect to campaign strategy and vice presidential selection.
Keywords
political science, social science, U.S. presidency, U.S. vice presidency, campaigns and elections, political parties, political
behavior, political geography, campaign visits

Introduction
Strategic considerations figure prominently in public discussions of vice presidential selection. Certainly, this was evident in 2016. On the Democratic side, many observers
speculated that vice presidential candidate Tim Kaine’s fluency in Spanish would help Hillary Clinton to win votes
among Latinos (Felix & Shaik, 2016; Krauze, 2016).
Likewise, Kaine’s reputation as a “centrist bridge builder”
might increase the ticket’s appeal to political moderates
(Krauze, 2016), and as Virginia’s senator and former governor surely he could “deliver” that battleground state’s electoral votes (Tribune News Services, 2016). On the Republican
side, Donald Trump’s selection of Mike Pence reportedly
“was made, in part, to help shore up conservative support
throughout the Midwest and Rust Belt states” from which the
Indiana governor hailed (Hillyard, 2016; also see McPherson,
2016; Villa, 2016).
Recent empirical analyses cast doubt upon a running
mate’s ability to secure an electoral advantage among select
demographic groups of voters and voters within his or her
home state (see Devine & Kopko, 2016; Kopko & Devine,
2016). Nonetheless, the perception that running mates could
produce such electoral advantages is widespread. But does
that perception affect the actual conduct of a presidential

campaign? Do the campaigns view the running mate as a
unique strategic asset, to be deployed according to his or her
(perceived) strengths, or as a means of reinforcement for the
presidential candidate and his or her message?
It is possible, after all, that the strategic objective of
choosing a running mate who appeals to voters alienated
from, or less than enthusiastic about, the presidential candidate primarily is symbolic. In this case, the campaign’s
goal simply might be to create the image of a well-rounded
ticket and, in doing so, to improve perceptions of the presidential candidate among skeptical but persuadable voters. The vice presidential candidate’s role, then, would be
to echo a shared message of what the ticket stands for and
campaign in a parallel fashion. Alternatively, the presidential candidate might view his or her running mate as a
more effective ambassador to voters who share a particular identity or affiliation, when those voters are
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unrepresented at the top of the ticket. In this case, the
campaign would strategically deploy the vice presidential
candidate to engage such voters with direct appeals that
exploit their common bond in a way that the presidential
cannot—or, at least, not as effectively. Likewise, the presidential candidate would skew his or her efforts toward
appealing to voters with a shared identity or affiliation of
their own. Essentially, the ticket would appeal to the same
group of voters, as a whole, but divide its labors in such a
way as to maximize receptivity by playing to each candidate’s (perceived) strengths.
Moreover, if the latter is true, then among which groups
of voters—if any—can we reasonably discern that the campaigns perceived the presidential versus vice presidential
candidate to have a strategic advantage? For that matter, is
there an empirical basis for discerning which advantages the
campaign might have believed to be real and electorally consequential when selecting the vice presidential candidate?
Anecdotal evidence from the campaign trail might indicate
such a perception; for instance, Tim Kaine made high-profile
speeches entirely in Spanish to largely Latino audiences
(Morin, 2016), and Mike Pence raised reporters’ eyebrows
with “peculiar” visits to conservative outposts in rural
America (Hillyard, 2016; also see Beaumont, 2016). But
anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to establish patterns of
activity and make reliable inferences; to do so, requires systematic analysis.
This study is the first to evaluate whether campaigns use
the presidential versus vice presidential candidate disproportionately to appeal to voters with whom that individual shares
a strategically advantageous affiliation (and, if so, which
ones). To answer this research question, we analyze an original database of campaign visits in the 2016 presidential election, that includes population characteristics (i.e., demographic
and political) associated with each locale that hosted a campaign visit. Our analysis provides direct insight into the strategic considerations that reasonably might be inferred to have
influenced specific vice presidential selections—in contrast
to previous studies analyzing the strategic considerations
influencing selection processes, generally (Baumgartner,
2008; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997).
To the extent that presidential tickets campaign in parallel
fashion, echoing a common message targeted at the same
voting constituency, we should find no systematic differences in the populations visited by either member of the
ticket. Also, the candidates should visit the same locales
roughly in equal proportions. Alternatively, if a campaign
perceives that the presidential versus vice presidential candidate has a strategic advantage in appealing to voters who
share a particular identity or affiliation, and campaign
accordingly, the populations visited by each candidate should
vary systematically and in accordance with the candidate’s
characteristics. Also, the candidates should visit a given
locale quite disproportionately, essentially dividing up the
campaign’s “battleground” territory.

SAGE Open

Why Campaign Visits?
Evaluating campaign strategy typically requires making
inferences based upon patterns of resource allocation, as
most scholars do not have direct access to the inner workings
of a campaign (but see King & Morehouse, 2004; Shaw,
2006) and campaign personnel either will not describe their
strategy openly or cannot be relied upon to describe it accurately. The most commonly cited empirical indicators of
campaign strategy are candidate visits and advertising expenditures—often described by political scientists as the campaign equivalents of “time” and “money” (Bartels, 1985;
Johnston, Hagen, & Jamieson, 2004; Shaw, 1999, 2006). The
former, by many accounts, provides particular strategic
insight; according to Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw (2002),
“Most campaign strategists will say that a candidate’s time is
the campaign’s most valuable resource” (p. 50; also see Chen
& Reeves, 2011; King & Morehouse, 2004).1
Why is this the case? First, “Unlike financial resources,
which depend on willing contributors, time is contributed by
candidates and therefore controlled by them” (West, 1983, p.
517). Second, candidate appearances—the principal means
by which campaigns commoditize the candidate’s time—
serve a number of strategically valuable purposes, including
providing a “controlled environment” (Wood, 2016, p. 111)
in which candidates typically speak to “sympathetic, partisan
audiences” (Holbrook & McClurg, 2005, p. 692) while
attracting free, abundant, and largely positive local media
coverage that is exceptionally likely to reach voters in the
surrounding media market (Herr, 2002; Holbrook, 2002;
King & Morehouse, 2004). In this way, campaign visits can
serve to mobilize supporters through direct means, while
also persuading undecided voters through indirect means
(Jones, 1998).
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, candidate
visits can be targeted toward particular groups of voters that
a campaign seeks to mobilize or persuade. As West (1983)
explains, “In a world of limited time, candidates must make
choices. They must emphasize certain constituencies and
deemphasize others. These choices are not random” (p. 525).
Indeed, he finds that presidential candidates during the 1980
primary and general election campaigns tended to speak to
audiences that reflected their intended electoral coalition.
For instance, Republican candidates who sought to expand
beyond the party’s base were more likely to address audiences of voters—including union members, Catholics, and
racial minorities—who belonged to groups that traditionally
aligned with the Democratic Party. Moreover, West (1983)
finds that the candidates often made personalized appeals at
these events, by “communicat[ing] their ‘identifications’ and
sympathies with voters” (p. 517).
It is, therefore, reasonable that political scientists often
use campaign visits—and, in many cases, advertising expenditures—to make inferences about presidential campaign
strategy. For example, resource allocations have been used to
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discern whether campaigns seek to maximize their Electoral
College versus popular vote totals (Brams & Davis, 1974),
employ a “base strategy” of mobilization versus a “peripheral strategy” of persuasion (Chen & Reeves, 2011), and perceive the vice presidential candidate as providing an electoral
advantage in his or her home state (Devine & Kopko, 2016).
The logic of our analysis mirrors that of previous studies: We
infer the campaigns’ perceptions of strategic advantage based
upon the pattern of choices that they made in allocating a
resource generally within their control and regarded as valuable—namely, candidate visits. In essence, we seek to determine whether the 2016 presidential campaigns acted as if
they believed that their presidential versus vice presidential
candidates more effectively could appeal to voters with
whom they shared a salient identity or affiliation.

Data for this analysis come from an original database of
campaign visits in 2016—specifically, including visits made
by either member of the Democratic or Republican ticket,
between the vice presidential candidate’s official introduction (July 16 for Republicans and July 22 for Democrats) and
Election Day (November 7). We use these data to test a series
of hypotheses, described in this section, pertaining to the
strategic allocation of presidential versus vice presidential
campaign visits.

we could not document it properly, we excluded it from our
analysis. In total, we identified 515 campaign visits—including 88 by Hillary Clinton; 96 by Tim Kaine; 13 by Clinton/
Kaine, jointly (counted once for each candidate); 139 by
Donald Trump; 130 by Mike Pence; and 18 by Trump/Pence,
jointly (counted once for each candidate).
For each campaign visit, we also collected data on the
demographic and political characteristics of the county in
which it occurred.4 Demographic data were obtained from
the U.S. Census Bureau,5 and they included estimates of a
county’s population density, median income level, percentage of college graduates, African Americans, Latinos, military veterans, and 2010-2015 population growth. In addition,
we obtained county-level estimates for the number of evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics per
1,000 residents, from the Association of Statisticians of
American Religious Bodies’ 2010 U.S. Religion Census.6 In
terms of political characteristics, we measure a county’s
competitiveness as the squared difference in two-party vote
share from the 2012 presidential election.7 Because party
competition only roughly approximates ideology and there is
no reliable county-level measure of the latter,8 we also estimate local ideology using the DW-NOMINATE score for the
U.S. Representative in whose district the event took place.9
Finally, we include variables to indicate whether the visit
took place in the presidential or vice presidential candidate’s
home region, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.10

Data

Hypotheses

For the purposes of this analysis, we define campaign visits
as any public appearance—counted discretely, to include
multiple visits within a given day—made by the presidential
and/or vice presidential candidate that was apparently organized or selected by the campaign, or the candidates themselves, for the purpose of appealing to a localized
concentration of voters. Included in this analysis are unscheduled events, such as visits to local businesses, restaurants,
and campaign offices, provided that they involved direct
interaction with voters and attracted media coverage.
Excluded from our analysis are events that do not meet this
definition, such as press conferences, private fundraisers,
national conferences or conventions, and attendance at other
nationally oriented events (e.g., the 9/11 commemoration in
New York City).2
To identify qualifying events, first we consulted the candidates’ public schedules—from their campaign websites
and other media sources—and then we verified the event’s
occurrence, or in many cases discovered unscheduled visits,
by searching for information from media websites and the
candidates’ social media accounts. If we were able to validate an event’s occurrence and location using two sources of
reliable, direct documentation (e.g., coverage by a reputable
news source, video footage, photos posted by the campaign),3
we counted it in our analysis. If an event was canceled or if

There is ample evidence to suggest that presidential campaigns often select vice presidential candidates at least partly
based upon their demographic (e.g., home state, age, sex,
religion) or political (e.g., ideology) characteristics
(Baumgartner, 2008; Devine & Kopko, 2016; Goldstein,
2016). Presumably, they do so in hopes of appealing to strategically important voters who share these characteristics—
even if there is very limited evidence that running mates
actually win votes among these targeted groups (Devine &
Kopko, 2016; Kopko & Devine, 2016). To the extent that
campaigns perceive targeted appeals based upon shared
characteristics to be effective and seek to capitalize upon
them during the campaign, we should expect to find a positive relationship between a candidate’s demographic and
political affiliations and the population characteristics associated with his or her campaign visits. This is our overarching research hypothesis. From it, we can also derive more
specific hypotheses for the Republican and Democratic presidential tickets in 2016, using the population variables
described above.
Based upon their demographic and political characteristics or affiliations, we hypothesize that Mike Pence was more
likely than Donald Trump to visit counties that were
Midwestern (home region), more rural (population density),
more conservative (ideology), and more populated by

Data, Hypotheses, and Methodology
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traditional, middle- to upper-class members of the Republican
establishment (income, college education) and evangelical
Protestants (religion). Likewise, we hypothesize that Tim
Kaine was more likely than Hillary Clinton to visit Southern
(home region), moderate (ideology), battleground (competitiveness) counties, with larger populations of Catholics (religion), and Spanish speakers (Latinos). Also, as both vice
presidential candidates had sons serving in the military at the
time of the campaign, we hypothesize that they were more
likely than their presidential counterparts to visit counties
with higher percentages of military personnel (veterans).
For the presidential candidates, we hypothesize that
Trump and Clinton both were more likely than their running
mates to visit northeastern (home region) and more urban
(population density) counties, as well as ones with more
mainline Protestants (religion). Also, based upon his campaign rhetoric, we expect that Trump was more likely than
Pence to visit White (race), working-class (income, college
education) counties in economically distressed areas (population growth). Given Clinton’s strong support among
African Americans during the 2016 primaries (Kurtzleben,
2016), we hypothesize that she was more likely than Kaine to
visit counties with a higher African American population
(race). Finally, as the first female major party nominee, we
also hypothesize that she was more likely than Kaine to visit
counties marked by indicators of socially progressive views
on gender roles—including those that were more educated
(college graduates), more wealthy (income), economically
and socially dynamic (population growth), and less traditional (evangelical Protestants).

(vice) presidential candidate to counteract a visit by the
opposing (vice) presidential candidate.
If, on the contrary, presidential campaigns differentially
allocate campaign visits based upon the perceived electoral
strengths of the presidential versus vice presidential candidate, we should find the opposite pattern. That is, the demographic and political characteristics of the local population
should predict whether it receives a visit from one member
of the party ticket or the other, and in a direction consistent
with that candidate’s identity or affiliations. Furthermore, we
should find that the campaigns largely divide up, rather than
trade off, duties by county. In other words, a visit by the presidential candidate to a given county should be positively
related to the number of times that he or she previously has
visited that county, and negatively related to the number of
times that the vice presidential candidate previously has visited that county.

Methodology

It is clear from Table 1 that both candidates on a given party
ticket generally campaigned in the same states. The
Republican candidates visited 28 states in total, with both
appearing in 16 of those states. While Trump visited six
states that Pence did not (Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Mississippi, Texas, Washington), plus Washington, D.C., and
Pence visited five states that Trump did not (Georgia, Indiana,
Missouri, Nebraska, Utah), very few of the ticket’s appearances occurred in these states, individually or in total. In fact,
286 of the Republicans’ 305 campaign visits (93.8%) took
place in states that both candidates visited. Trump and Pence
also visited states with similar frequency. For instance, the
three states that Pence visited most often—Ohio (24), North
Carolina (20), Pennsylvania (15)—also were tied for the
second-most visits by Trump, at 19 apiece. Florida, the state
that Trump visited most often (25), ranked just sixth on
Pence’s list—the only major discrepancy in the data. Overall,
there is a very high correlation (.859) between the number of
visits that Trump versus Pence made to the 28 states on their
campaign itinerary in 2016. Including the states that both
candidates did not visit, the correlation is even higher, at
.892.
The Democratic candidates visited 16 states in total, with
both appearing in 10 of those states. Clinton visited just two

To identify systematic differences in the strategic allocation
of campaign visits, and test the hypotheses described above,
we conduct a logistic regression analysis—separately for
each party ticket—predicting whether a visit to a given
county was made by the presidential (1) versus vice presidential (0) candidate. The independent variables in our models include each of the demographic and political
characteristics previously described. Also, we add a series of
variables representing the number of times that each candidate, on either ticket, had visited the same county prior to the
visit in question.
If it is the case that presidential tickets campaign as a
united front, targeting the same constituency of voters, we
should find that the demographic and political characteristics
of a given population have no bearing on whether it was targeted for a visit by the presidential versus vice presidential
candidate. Also, with respect to previous campaign visits, we
should find that each ticket essentially trades off visits within
a given county; that is, if the presidential candidate has visited the county, the vice presidential will take the next turn.
And the two will be equally likely to respond to a visit by
their counterpart on the other ticket, rather than assigning the

Results
To provide context—as well as some initial evidence—for
the analysis to follow, in Table 1 we present the total number
of presidential and vice presidential campaign visits in 2016,
by state. Then, we compare visit allocations at the state versus county level, to identify potential differences in campaign strategy—specifically, with respect to the activity of
presidential versus vice presidential candidates—across versus within states.

Total Visits by State
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Table 1. Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Visits by
State, 2016.
Republican ticket

Democratic ticket

State

Trump

Pence

Total

Clinton

Kaine

Total

AL
AZ
CO
CT
DC
FL
GA
IA
IL
IN
LA
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
NC
NE
NH
NM
NV
NY
OH
PA
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI
Total

0
3
10
1
2
25
0
8
1
0
2
3
9
1
0
1
19
0
9
1
5
3
19
19
1
0
9
1
5
157

0
3
7
0
0
10
3
11
0
3
2
0
8
1
2
0
20
1
9
4
5
2
24
15
0
1
13
0
4
148

0
6
17
1
2
35
3
19
1
3
4
3
17
2
2
1
39
1
18
5
10
5
43
34
1
1
22
1
9
305

0
1
3
0
0
23
0
5
1
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
17
1
3
0
9
0
15
18
0
0
0
0
0
101

1
2
2
0
0
26
0
5
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
15
0
7
0
4
0
10
17
4
0
5
0
6
109

1
3
5
0
0
49
0
10
1
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
32
1
10
0
13
0
25
35
4
0
5
0
6
210

states that Kaine did not (Illinois and Nebraska), while Kaine
visited four states that Clinton did not (Alabama, Texas,
Virginia, Wisconsin). Again, most Democratic campaign visits—192 of 210 (91.4%)—took place in states to which both
candidates traveled, and with similar frequency. In fact,
Clinton and Kaine most frequently visited the same four
states, and in the same rank order: Florida (Clinton 23, Kaine
26), Pennsylvania (18, 17), North Carolina (17, 15), Ohio
(15, 10). Clinton’s and Kaine’s visits are even more highly
correlated than those of their Republican counterparts—.906
for the 16 states in which one or both candidates appeared
and .938 when including all states.
Based upon this evidence, it appears that each presidential
campaign used its presidential and vice presidential candidates to target mostly the same subset of battleground states,
and with almost the same frequency. However, this does not
mean that the campaigns used each candidate to target the
same population of voters. After all, states are diverse geographical units, and for various reasons—including those

relating to the candidates’ identities and affiliations, as
described above—campaigns might send the presidential
versus vice presidential candidate to different parts of a state
(e.g., a city or county) where they are expected to have
greater appeal. If so, the similarities found in Table 1, with
regard to the presidential tickets’ state-level campaign visits,
might mask stark differences in the strategic deployment of
candidates within the same states.11

Total Visits by County
Indeed, a parallel analysis of county-level visits shows much
greater disparities between the candidates. First, most of the
counties visited by a presidential or vice presidential candidate in 2016—180 of 258 counties (69.8%), overall—were
visited by one member of the party ticket but not the other.
Among Republicans, Donald Trump visited 108 counties, 57
of which Mike Pence did not (52.8%); Pence visited 111
counties, 60 of which Trump did not (54.1%). Among
Democrats, Hillary Clinton visited 48 counties, 21 of which
Tim Kaine did not (43.8%); Kaine visited 69 counties, 42 of
which Clinton did not (60.9%).
In terms of total campaign visits, a sizable proportion took
place within counties visited by one member of a ticket and
not the other—for Republicans, 126 of 305 visits (41.3%),
and for Democrats, 84 of 210 visits (40.0%). These figures
are virtually identical for Trump (40.8%) and Pence (41.9%),
but more disparate for Clinton (30.7%) and Kaine (48.6%).
Most striking of all is the correlation between the number of
visits per county by the presidential versus vice presidential
candidate (including only the counties that were visited by at
least one member of the ticket)—just .300 for Trump–Pence
and .462 for Clinton–Kaine.
This analysis suggests an important conclusion about
presidential campaign strategy in 2016: The presidential and
vice presidential candidates on a given ticket did, in fact,
tend to campaign in the same battleground states and with
similar frequency, but at the same time they tended to campaign in different parts of those states. Were those differences random, or systematically related to characteristics of
the local population? And, if systematic, did the characteristics of the local population match those of the candidate in
such a way as to suggest the perception of a strategic advantage based upon shared identity or affiliation? To answer
these questions, next we analyze the local demographic and
political characteristics associated with each campaign visit.

Bivariate Analysis
In this section, we estimate the empirical relationship
between our dependent variable (DV)—coded to indicate a
visit by the presidential (1) versus vice presidential (0) candidate on a given ticket—and a series of independent variables representing each of the demographic and political
population characteristics previously described.12 Our first
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step in doing so is to estimate the bivariate relationship
between the DV and each population characteristic, using
difference of means testing. Essentially, this analysis tells us
whether the locales visited by the presidential candidate on a
given ticket significantly differed from those visited by the
vice presidential candidate, on average. We count each campaign visit discretely when calculating a candidate’s mean
population characteristics. As a result, the population characteristics of a given locale are weighted according to the number of times that it was visited by the candidate in question.
For instance, Hillary Clinton made five visits to Miami-Dade
County, Florida, and one visit to Palm Beach County, Florida;
therefore, when calculating the mean population characteristics of a Clinton visit, Miami-Dade County has 5 times the
weight of Palm Beach County.
Our bivariate analyses indicate some significant differences in the populations associated with a presidential versus
vice presidential candidate’s visit, on both tickets. First, with
respect to the Democratic ticket, Hillary Clinton visited
counties with significantly higher percentages of African
Americans, on average, than those visited by Tim Kaine.
Also, the average population density associated with a
Clinton visit is higher, albeit at marginal levels of statistical
significance. Kaine, in comparison with Clinton, visited
counties that were significantly more competitive in the 2012
presidential election and had higher percentages of evangelical Protestants. Also, Kaine’s visits took place in significantly more conservative—or, in context, more
moderate13—congressional districts than Clinton’s. There is
additional evidence, although marginally significant, that
Kaine visited counties with higher percentages of military
veterans and college graduates. Some of these differences
clearly align with the respective candidates’ characteristics.
Clinton, as noted above, had strong ties to the African
American community. Also, she was a senator from one of
the nation’s most densely populated states, New York, and
her campaign headquarters were located in Brooklyn.
Kaine’s visits align with his profile as a relatively moderate
senator from a battleground state, whose son was currently
serving in the military. It is less clear why he would campaign in counties with more college graduates, and especially
ones with more evangelical Protestants, as he is a Catholic.
Our analysis of the Republican ticket yields fewer significant differences. Donald Trump visited counties with higher
percentages of African Americans in comparison with Mike
Pence, but this difference is only marginally significant.
Pence visited counties with significantly higher percentages
of mainline Protestants, in comparison with Trump, and
more ideologically conservative congressional districts.
Also, Pence was marginally more likely to visit states in his
home region of the Midwest. The latter differences align
with Pence’s profile as a conservative, Midwestern governor,
whose role in the campaign, many believed, was to reach out
to voters who shared these affiliations. However, it is less
clear why he would campaign in areas with more mainline

SAGE Open
Protestants, as Trump—not Pence, an evangelical
Protestant—shares this identity. Trump’s visits to more heavily African American counties also seem surprising, given
that his primary and general election campaigns were widely
perceived as appeals to White, working-class voters.
However, Trump announced his attention to appeal to African
Americans during the campaign, and his pattern of campaign
visits reflects just such an effort.
Of course, bivariate analyses are limited, methodologically, because they do not account for intervening variables
and therefore might misidentify causal relationships. For
example, it might be the case that Kaine did not visit counties
with higher percentages of evangelical Protestants because
he was trying to appeal to evangelical Protestants; rather, he
might have been trying to appeal to ideological moderates,
who just happen to live in counties with more evangelical
Protestants as compared with the relatively liberal areas that
Clinton tended to visit. To better disentangle the causal relationship between population characteristics and candidate
visits, next we present results from a multivariate analysis
conducted separately for each presidential ticket.

Multivariate Analysis
Table 2 presents results from two logistic regression models,
analyzing campaign visits made by the Republican ticket
(column 1) and the Democratic ticket (column 2) in 2016.
The DV in each model is coded 1 for a visit by the presidential candidate on a given ticket, and 0 for a visit by the vice
presidential candidate. The independent variables included
in each model represent the demographic and political characteristics of the geographic area in which a given campaign
visit took place. In addition, we include four variables measuring the number of times that each candidate previously
had visited the county in question, to better understand how
presidential tickets “share” (or do not share) campaign territory and respond (or do not respond) to visits by the opposing
ticket.
The results in column 1 indicate that Mike Pence visited
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and
mainline Protestants, as well as congressional districts that
were more ideologically conservative, than Donald Trump.
Each of these differences is statistically significant at p <
.05. Also, at marginal significance levels (p < .10), we find
that Pence visited counties with a higher percentage of
Latinos. Some of this evidence is consistent with the notion
that Pence could more effectively appeal to traditional
Republicans, including conservatives and individuals with a
higher socioeconomic status, than Trump. Also, to the extent
that Pence campaigned in more heavily Latino areas, this
may reflect concerns that Trump was personally alienating to
such voters given his harsh rhetoric on immigration and
toward Mexicans or Mexican Americans. That Pence also
campaigned in areas with more mainline Protestants is mystifying, given that Trump shared this religious affiliation and
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Table 2. Logit Models Predicting Presidential Versus Vice
Presidential Candidate Visits, 2016.
Independent variables
Population growth, 20102015
Population density
Median income
College graduate %
African American %
Latino %
Military veteran %
Evangelical
protestants/1,000
Mainline
protestants/1,000
Catholics/1,000
Home region:
Presidential candidate
Home region: Vice
presidential candidate
County competitiveness,
2012
State competitiveness,
2012
Congressional District
Ideology
No. of previous visits:
Clinton
No. of previous visits:
Kaine
No. of previous visits:
Trump
No. of previous visits:
Pence
Constant
N
% Reduction in error
% correctly predicted
DV = 0 (Vice
presidential campaign
visit)
DV = 1 (Presidential
campaign visit)

Republican ticket

Democratic ticket

0.058
(0.043)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.071*
(0.028)
0.020
(0.017)
−0.033†
(0.018)
−0.112
(0.084)
0.002
(0.002)
−0.009**
(0.004)
0.002
(0.002)
0.106
(0.711)
−0.588
(0.531)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.001
(0.001)
−0.701*
(0.290)
−0.167
(0.216)
0.020
(0.177)
−0.789***
(0.230)
0.953***
(0.270)
2.627†
(1.561)
266
36.43%

0.206**
(0.071)
0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.096*
(0.043)
0.025
(0.032)
−0.044†
(0.024)
−0.167
(0.169)
−0.018
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.545
(0.696)
0.343
(0.727)
−0.000
(0.000)
0.004
(0.003)
−0.857*
(0.405)
−0.462*
(0.200)
0.552*
(0.221)
0.249
(0.222)
0.402†
(0.241)
5.815†
(3.000)
184
48.86%

67%

74%

71%

77%

Note. The DV in each model is coded to represent a campaign visit by
the presidential (1) versus vice presidential (0) candidate on a given party
ticket. The independent variables represent county-level population
characteristics, unless otherwise noted. Entries are logistic regression
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. DV = dependent
variable.
Statistical significance: †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Pence did not. In fact, it may be even more interesting to note
the population characteristics that did not predict a visit by
Trump versus Pence. Contrary to popular perceptions of
Pence’s electoral appeal, he was no more likely than Trump
to campaign in rural areas, the Midwest, battleground states
or counties, and among large populations of evangelical
Protestants. As a whole, these results are decidedly mixed:
On one hand, Trump and Pence campaigned in distinguishable locales that, in some cases, corresponded to salient
aspects of their personal or political identity; on the other
hand, the populations they visited were indistinguishable in
most respects, some of which were commonly associated
with the candidates and even viewed as likely reasons for
Pence’s selection as a vice presidential candidate.
Further complicating our evaluation of the Republican
candidates’ strategic partnership is the performance of the
campaign visits variables. A visit by Trump versus Pence to
a given county can be predicted, at conventional significance
levels, by the number of times that either candidate previously had visited the county—but not in the direction that
one would expect if the candidates were dividing territory
between them, rather than sharing it. Indeed, Pence became
more likely to visit a county as Trump’s previous visits to the
same increased; likewise, Trump became more likely to visit
a county as Pence’s previous visits to the same increased.14 It
is also noteworthy that the number of campaign visits to a
given county by the opposing candidates does not predict a
visit by Trump versus Pence. This is not same as saying that
the Republican ticket decided against responding to visits by
their opponents, as our DV is constructed to predict a visit by
one versus the other Republican candidate, not the ticket as a
whole. However, one might suspect that such “response” visits, to the extent that they occur, are made in kind, with the
(vice) presidential candidate being commissioned to directly
counteract the efforts of the opposing (vice) presidential candidate. Judging by these results, that is not the case.
We find a similar pattern of results for the Democratic
ticket, in column 2. Indeed, the populations visited by Clinton
versus Kaine are distinguishable in several respects. Clinton
was more likely to visit counties with higher levels of recent
population growth, whereas Kaine was more likely to visit
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and
evangelical Protestants. Also, Kaine was more likely to visit
ideologically moderate, or less liberal, congressional districts, than Clinton. Each of these differences is statistically
significant at p < .05. Interestingly, but only at p < .10, we
also find that Kaine was more likely to visit areas with a
higher percentage of Latinos. The latter finding validates,
albeit with limited confidence, the notion that the Democratic
campaign perceived Kaine as having a strategic advantage in
appealing to Latinos, due to his fluency in Spanish, and that
this might have contributed to his selection as a vice presidential candidate. The same can be said, with greater confidence, about his perceived appeal to moderate voters that
might have been alienated by Clinton’s liberal reputation.
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Once more, though, it is unclear why Kaine would have campaigned among more college-educated and evangelical
populations.
But perhaps more striking, and in keeping with our findings for Republicans, are the ways in which Clinton’s and
Kaine’s campaign visits did not differ. Clinton was no more
likely than Kaine to campaign in counties with higher population density or more African Americans, and Kaine was no
more likely than Clinton to campaign in counties with more
Catholics or veterans, in battleground states or counties, or in
the region encompassing his battleground home state of
Virginia.15 Our conclusion echoes that stated above with
respect to the Republican ticket: These are decidedly mixed
results, some of which point to strategic differentiation based
upon candidate characteristics and many more that do not.
Our results further parallel the Republican model when
analyzing the campaign visits variables, with one minor
qualification. Again, we find that the frequency with which
Democratic candidates previously had visited a given county
significantly predicts a present visit by Clinton versus
Kaine—but in the direction of sharing, rather than dividing,
territory. That is, Kaine became more likely to visit a county
as Clinton’s previous visits to the same increased; likewise,
Clinton became more likely to visit a county as Kaine’s previous visits to the same increased. In terms of responding to
the opposing ticket, Trump’s previous visits to a county do
not significantly predict a present visit by Clinton versus
Kaine. On the contrary, Pence’s previous visits predict a
present visit by Clinton—but at the marginal significance
level of p = .095. Overall, Clinton and Kaine—like Trump
and Pence—appear more responsive to their running mate’s
activity within a particular county, than that of their counterpart on the opposing ticket.
Finally, our models’ overall performance indicates that
the allocation of presidential versus vice presidential campaign visits in 2016 was not random but, in fact, fairly systematic when accounting for local population characteristics
and other strategic considerations. For the Democratic ticket,
our model accurately predicts which candidate visited a
given county approximately three quarters of the time—77%
for Hillary Clinton and 74% for Tim Kaine. And, in comparison with predicting which candidate visited a county based
on random chance, alone, the model reduces prediction error
by an impressive 48.86%. The Republican ticket proved less
predictable, but still far from random in its visit allocations.
Here, our model accurately predicts which candidate visited
a given county at least two thirds of the time—71% for
Donald Trump and 67% for Mike Pence. And, in comparison
with a random prediction model, it yields a proportional
reduction in error of 36.43%.
If each presidential ticket had campaigned as a unit, or if
a particular candidate’s deployment on the campaign trail
reflected no strategy other than that which guided the ticket
as a whole, then predicting visit allocation patterns based
upon the variables included in our model should have
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provided little, if any, empirical insight. Clearly, that is not
the case.

Discussion
Do presidential campaigns believe that the vice presidential
candidate provides a strategic advantage in appealing to voters with whom he or she shares a salient identity or affiliation? And do those perceptions of an advantage influence the
actual conduct of a campaign, such that presidential and vice
presidential candidates disproportionately target their
appeals toward groups of voters who share their personal
characteristics? Or is the running mate’s role simply to reinforce the campaign’s message, by multiplying—rather than
diversifying—the presidential candidate’s efforts to communicate that message to a shared constituency of voters?
To answer these questions, we analyze an original database of presidential and vice presidential candidate visits in
2016. In particular, we compare the geographic areas to
which either candidate on a given ticket traveled, to identify
whether the demographic and political characteristics of the
local population differed systematically between them, and
whether those differences align with each candidate’s personal characteristics in such a way as to suggest the campaign’s perception of a strategic advantage.
Our analysis indicates that the 2016 presidential and vice
presidential candidates’ campaign visits differed significantly, in many respects. First, although the candidates on
each party ticket campaigned almost entirely in the same
battleground states, and with similar frequency, their travels
within states often diverged. Approximately 40% of each
ticket’s campaign visits occurred in counties that the presidential candidate visited but the vice presidential candidate
did not, or vice versa. Moreover, the total number of visits
per county by each set of candidates is modestly correlated,
at .300 for Republicans and .462 for Democrats. By way of
comparison, less than 10% of each ticket’s campaign visits
occurred in states visited by one candidate and not the other,
while the candidates’ total number of visits by state is highly
correlated, at .859 for Republicans and .906 for Democrats.
The campaigns’ evident coordination of state-level presidential and vice presidential candidate visits suggests a coherent
strategy and the will, as well as the ability, to implement it; to
assume that the much lesser degree of coordination within
states somehow was not strategically motivated, then, seems
unreasonable.
Our logistic regression models also indicate systematic
differences in the allocation of presidential versus vice
presidential campaign visits. For the Democratic ticket, we
find that Hillary Clinton was more likely than Tim Kaine to
visit counties that had recently experienced higher levels of
population growth. Also, at conventional significance levels, we find that Kaine was more likely than Clinton to visit
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and
evangelical Protestants, as well as more moderate
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congressional districts; at marginal significance levels,
Kaine was more likely to visit counties with higher percentages of Latinos. For the Republican ticket, we find that
Mike Pence was more likely than Donald Trump to visit
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and
mainline Protestants, as well as more conservative congressional districts. Moreover, at marginal significance levels,
we find that Pence was more likely to visit counties with a
higher percentage of Latinos.
This evidence indicates that while presidential and vice
presidential candidates run together on the same ticket, and
usually in the same states, their campaign activities are not
merely parallel or duplicative. Vice presidential candidates,
at least in 2016, frequently campaigned in different counties
than the presidential candidate, and among distinguishable
populations. But does this prove that the observed differences were strategically motivated? For that matter, can we
reasonably infer that the vice presidential candidates were
selected, at least in part, for the purpose of appealing to the
populations that they visited disproportionately on behalf of
their ticket?
Obviously, we cannot know the answers to these questions
with any certainty. However, we do find evidence of an alignment between some of the population characteristics that predict a vice presidential campaign visit and the personal
characteristics of that candidate, which at least suggests that
perceptions of a strategic advantage might have influenced
vice presidential selection. For instance, both running mates
were significantly more likely than the presidential candidate
to visit congressional districts that aligned with their ideological profile—in Kaine’s case, more moderate districts, and in
Pence’s case, more conservative districts. On the contrary, the
demographic predictors of a vice presidential campaign visit
are less clearly related to the candidate’s personal characteristics, except for the marginal finding that Kaine was more
likely to campaign in areas with higher Latino populations,
and perhaps the finding that Pence was more likely to campaign in areas with a higher percentage of college graduates
(i.e., higher socioeconomic status). Indeed, many of the personal characteristics cited in public discussions of Kaine’s
and Pence’s electoral appeal, prior and subsequent to vice
presidential selection, had no evident effect on where they
campaigned—including religious affiliation, population density, military service, or home region. This evidence undercuts any suggestion that the campaigns believed their running
mates presented a strategic advantage in appealing to voters
on these bases, or even selected them with such advantages in
mind. For that matter, our analysis indicates that campaigns
are more likely to value a vice presidential candidate’s ability
to appeal to voters on the basis of ideological, rather than
demographic, affiliation.
Indeed, we must not go too far in characterizing the
strategic significance of vice presidential candidates, and
the degree to which presidential tickets diverge in the targeting of their campaign appeals. While we have identified

systematic differences in the campaign activities of presidential and vice presidential candidates, in some respects
those activities overlap. Perhaps most notably, our logistic
regression models indicate that the candidates did not simply divide up the campaign battleground, repeatedly visiting a designated sphere of influence to the exclusion of the
other candidate. Rather, for both tickets, we find that the
presidential candidate becomes more likely to visit a county
as his or her vice presidential candidate’s previous visits to
the same increase, and vice versa. This does not mean that
the candidates trade off appearances, in tat-for-tat fashion,
so as to visit each locale in equal proportions; the evidence
already presented demonstrates that this is not the case. A
more reasonable interpretation is that the campaigns require
both candidates’ presence in counties deemed sufficiently
important to merit multiple, or even many, visits.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that while a sizable proportion of campaign visits—approximately 40%, for both parties—take place in counties not visited by the other member
of the ticket, conversely it is the case that the majority take
place in counties that both candidates have visited.
For these reasons, it would be a misinterpretation of our
empirical findings to conclude that presidential and vice
presidential candidates conduct divergent campaigns, targeting different populations of voters. It would be more accurate
to conclude that, at least in 2016, the presidential campaigns
coordinated their candidates’ activities so as to appeal to
mostly the same voters while in some instances engaging in
disproportionate allocations based upon the perceived electoral strengths of either candidate.

Conclusion
This analysis makes an important contribution to existing
scholarship on vice presidential candidates, and campaign
strategy in general. First, whereas previous studies examine
the patterns and electoral effects of vice presidential (as well
as presidential) campaign visits (e.g., Althaus et al., 2002;
Hill, Rodriguez, & Wooden, 2010; Shaw, 2006), ours is the
first to test for systematic differences in the strategic allocation of campaign visits within a party ticket, based on demographic and political population characteristics. In doing so,
we also provide direct insight into the strategic considerations that may have influenced specific vice presidential
selections—in contrast to previous studies analyzing the
strategic considerations influencing selection processes, generally (Baumgartner, 2008; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997).
Finally, this research builds upon a limited number of previous studies that use local population characteristics to discern campaign strategy with respect to the allocation of
campaign visits within, rather than across, states (Althaus
et al., 2002; Chen & Reeves, 2011). Indeed, our analysis
adds relevant variables not included in those previous studies, such as religious affiliation and ideology, that we find to
be predictive of visit allocations.
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This analysis also suggests several valuable opportunities
for future research. The most obvious such opportunity is to
extend our methodology to past elections, so as to generalize
or contextualize our conclusions about the strategic role of
vice presidential candidates, beyond 2016. This is a practical
goal, as there are identifiable strategic advantages associated
with each vice presidential candidacy and they can be measured using the same variables, from the same data sources
(e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, DW-NOMINATE, election
results), employed here. Also, the empirical insights gained
from this research can be used to better understand the effect
of vice presidential, as well as presidential, campaign visits
on voting behavior and state-level election outcomes.
Specifically, one could investigate the potential moderating
influence of strategically relevant local population characteristics on the electoral consequences of campaign visits to
determine whether those visits are more effective at increasing voter turnout or party vote share when targeted toward
populations that align with the characteristics of a particular
candidate. In essence, this would extend our analysis by
evaluating whether the campaign’s perception that a candidate has particular strength in appealing to an affiliated group
of voters actually has the intended effect.
Such research might be useful to presidential campaigns,
as well as scholars. As King and Morehouse (2004) note, in
reference to the latter’s experience working as a strategic
advisor and trip director for the Gore-Lieberman campaign in
2000, that campaign’s leadership “did not base [its campaign
travel expenditures] on any quantifiable data. They, like other
campaigns before and after, simply know that candidate visits
to targeted areas have a positive effect on voters” (p. 305). If,
in fact, candidates’ visits are disproportionately allocated to
appeal to groups of affiliated voters, but the anticipated strategic advantages prove to be ephemeral, then what the campaigns do not know actually might hurt them. And, if the
campaign’s anticipation of such advantages influences the
selection of a vice presidential candidate who is less qualified
to assume office if elected, then what they do not know might
hurt all of us.
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Notes
1. In most cases, presidential and vice presidential candidates
make campaign visits separately. This makes campaign visits
a more appropriate focus for our analysis, as we seek to draw
comparisons between the strategic uses of either candidate as
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a campaign resource. Vice presidential candidates are much
less likely to appear in campaign advertisements, and even less
likely to appear independently of the presidential candidate.
Therefore, we could not provide a robust comparison of “presidential” versus “vice presidential” campaign advertisements.
2. We use an original database for several reasons. Most importantly, we find that existing databases often include events
(e.g., fundraisers, national media appearances) that do not
meet the definition of campaign visits provided above, or
exclude events (e.g., visits to local businesses or campaign
offices) that meet our definition. Also, many of these databases do not recognize the occurrence of multiple events in
the same city or state within the same day, or they simply
miss events that should have been included. Two examples
will help to illustrate these discrepancies. Included in our data
set is a campaign visit by Hillary Clinton to the Cedar Park
Café in Philadelphia on November 6 (see CBS News, 2016),
and a visit by Mike Pence to Congressman David Brat’s campaign headquarters on November 5 (see Pence, 2016). Neither
of these events is captured by the most prominent campaign
visits databases from 2016, including FairVote (https://www.
nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016), National
Journal’s Travel Tracker (http://traveltracker.nationaljournal.
com), and Democracy in Action (http://www.p2016.org/chrn/
fall16.html#2). In each case, these sources indicate only one
campaign visit to the city or state on that day, and in some
cases, they specify a more salient visit to the area (respectively,
a church service and a campaign rally at a university) while
making no reference to the additional visit. Thus, the existing
databases omit—whether by design or by accident—events
that meet our standards for campaign visits. Also, our database—unlike Travel Tracker and, in many cases, Democracy
in Action—cites media documentation for each visit, which
allows us to precisely identify where the visit took place and
thus accurately characterize the host county’s demographic
and political characteristics.
3. Specifically, we performed an Internet search using details
(candidate name, city/state, event location if available) from
the candidate’s public schedules, their social media accounts,
or news items identified during these searches.
4. We also collected data on the municipality (e.g., city, town, village, borough) in which each visit occurred. We choose to use
county-level data, instead, for three reasons. First, several of
the population characteristics used in our analysis, such as religious identification and past presidential voting, are not available at the municipal level. Second, in more than 30 cases, all
involving small local units such as villages and boroughs, we
were unable to find U.S. Census Bureau data on many, if not
most, of the population characteristics included in this analysis. Finally, and most importantly, there is no doubt that the
intended audience for a campaign visit typically extends well
beyond the municipality in which it occurs, particularly due
to local media coverage. Indeed, many studies of campaign
visit (and other resource) allocations use the local media market as their unit of analysis (e.g., King & Morehouse, 2004;
Shaw, 2006). Although we find this approach reasonable and
perhaps even preferable, it is not amenable to a study of local
population characteristics because many of our data sources,
such as the Census Bureau, do not provide data at the media
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5.

6.
7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.

market level and often use measures such as median income
that cannot be accurately calculated by merging data from the
counties comprising a given media market. Moreover, many
studies of campaign resource allocations use the county as
their unit of analysis and provide compelling justifications for
doing so. Chen and Reeves (2011)—whose research is most
similar to ours, in that they analyze the relationship between
local population characteristics and campaign visit allocations
by each party ticket, generally—also cite as an advantage the
accessibility of county-level economic, demographic, and contextual variables. Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw (2002) analyze
the effect of campaign visits at the county and media market
levels, as well.
Specifically, we used the Census Bureau’s “American
FactFinder” (see https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/
pages/index.xhtml#) and QuickFacts (see https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00) resources.
See http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/
RCMSCY10.asp.
Elections data were obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of
U.S. Presidential Elections. See http://uselectionatlas.org/
RESULTS. To isolate the independent effect of county-level
dynamics, we also include a similar measure for state competitiveness in our empirical models.
Indeed, the county competitiveness and district ideology
variables (both squared) are not significantly correlated (r =
–.058).
See http://voteview.org/dwnomin.htm. DW-NOMINATE scores
are based on the most recently available data, for the 113th
Congress. Congressional districts were determined using the
exact location for each campaign visit, which is recorded in our
data set.
See https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf.
Chen and Reeves (2011) identify just such a pattern when analyzing where the Democratic (Obama–Biden) and Republican
(McCain–Palin) tickets campaigned in 2008. “It is well known
that Republicans and Democrats were making appearances
in largely the same states,” they explain, “but we find that
within those states, they were visiting different counties”
(Chen & Reeves, 2011, p. 541). Specifically, they conclude
that McCain–Palin largely pursued a “base strategy” by visiting counties that had voted more heavily Republican in the
2004 presidential election, while Obama–Biden pursued a
“peripheral strategy” by visiting counties with greater recent
population growth (but not counties that had voted more heavily Democratic or that were highly competitive in 2004).
As the purpose of this analysis is to understand why the presidential candidate visited a given location instead of the vice
presidential candidate, and vice versa, we exclude campaign
visits in which both candidates appeared together (13 for
Clinton–Kaine, 18 for Trump–Pence). We also exclude these
cases, for the same reason, from the subsequent multivariate
analysis.
The mean DW-NOMINATE score for Kaine’s visits was
0.135, versus −0.166 for Clinton’s. These scores are coded
to range from approximately −1 (most liberal) to +1 (most
conservative).
In other words, if the Republican campaign had identified
particular counties as being within Trump’s (Pence’s) sphere

of influence, to the exclusion of his running mate, we would
expect the Trump (Pence) visits variable to be statistically
significant and positively (negatively) signed; that is, past
Trump (Pence) visits to a given county would positively predict future Trump (Pence) visits to the same. Likewise, past
Pence (Trump) visits to a given county should negatively predict future Trump (Pence) visits to the same. But we find the
opposite pattern.
15. An alternative interpretation would be that Kaine, for instance,
was no more likely to visit his home region because the
Democratic campaign believed that his selection essentially
secured its votes and therefore did not require much direct
attention. However, North Carolina—neighbor to Kaine’s
Virginia—received more visits by the Democratic ticket than
all but two other states, and Kaine visited Virginia 5 times
while Clinton never visited the state. Moreover, if the campaign believed that a candidate’s affiliation with a geographic
region or demographic group made it redundant, or less valuable, to engage the voters in question with direct appeals,
then we might expect to observe significant differences in
the other direction—that is, the candidate should be significantly less likely than his or her running mate to visit affiliated
populations.
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